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Employees are using electronic media at an increasing rate to 
communicate with others both in and out of the workplace.  While email, social 
networking sites, blogs, text messages, and online videos may seem to present new 
and complex challenges for employees and employers, with just a few exceptions, the 
decisional law continues to suggest that the key to understanding issues presented by 
electronic media use is to reason by analogy to more “traditional” means of 
communication, even where the analogy may not seem to be a perfect fit.  For example, 
an email string between two people or among a group, may be viewed similarly to an in-
person conversation.  A comment posted on an employee’s Facebook page may be 
treated like a verbal comment made by an employee to friends and coworkers.  The 
same fundamental questions come up in the cases involving traditional or electronic 
communications:  What was communicated? Who communicated it?  When was it 
communicated? To whom was it communicated? 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide an updated overview of how the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”), the courts and arbitrators are 
applying existing rules about employee communications and activity to electronic media.  
While use of social media in general can raise a host of legal issues, this paper focuses 
in particular on protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 
issues of employee privacy and free speech rights and just cause for discipline. 
I. PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE NLRA 
 
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees shall possess “the right to 
self-organization . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . 
mutual aid or protection.”  This right is enforceable under Section 8(a)(1) and 
sometimes (3) of the NLRA, which prohibit employers from interfering, restraining or 
coercing employees who exercise their rights under Section 7, or from discriminating 
against employees because of their protected activity.  These rights apply to workplaces 
where a union represents the employees, and to non-union workplaces.  In recent 
years, the Board has addressed issues relating to both employee use of employer 
electronic media, as well as use of personal social media to engage in protected 
activity.  
A. Use of Employer Electronic Systems for Union Activity 
 
The Board has held that employees have no statutory right under the 
NLRA to use an employer’s email system for Section 7 matters.2  The Board explained 
that an employer has a “basic property right” to “regulate and restrict employee use of 
company property.”  Thus, an employer may lawfully ban non-work-related use of its 
email systems, so long as it discriminate against Section 7 protected activity.3  The 
                                            
2
 Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), review granted in part and remanded, Guard Publishing Co. v. 
NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009), on remand, 357 NLRB No. 27 (2011). 
3
 351 NLRB at 1114-1116.   
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employer in Register Guard had adopted a policy governing use of its communications 
systems, and that policy prohibited use of its systems “to solicit or proselytize for 
commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations or other non-
job-related solicitations.”  The Board found this policy to be a lawful regulation of the 
employer’s property.4  However, after many years of litigation, the Board ultimately 
found in 2011 that the employer had violated the NLRA by discriminatorily enforcing its 
communications systems policy.5 
Despite the policy’s clear prohibition of non-job-related solicitations 
through the employer’s electronic communications systems, the employer had not 
disciplined employees who used its email system for personal solicitations such as party 
invitations, baby announcements, offers of sports tickets and requests for services such 
as dog-walking.6  But when an employee sent emails to coworkers over the employer’s 
email system seeking support for union activities, the employer disciplined her for 
violating the policy.7 
In 2007, the Board had initially held that the employer lawfully restricted 
email pertaining to the union even if it allowed email for other uses, because there was 
no evidence that other employees had used email for organizational, as opposed to 
personal solicitations.8  The union appealed that ruling and two years later the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s reasoning and remanded the case to the 
Board.9  The court viewed the line drawn by the Board barring access to employer email 
based on the “organizational” purpose of the union as a “post hoc invention.”10  Further, 
the employer’s own policy made no such distinction between “personal” solicitation  and 
“organizational” solicitations.  In July, 2011, the Board ruled, based upon the District 
Court’s decision, that the employer had unlawfully discriminated against the employee 
who sent union-related emails when it did not enforce its policy against other employees 
sending non-job-related solicitations.11  Thus, for the time being at least, it appears that 
the Board will continue to apply its longstanding rules concerning discriminatory 
enforcement of otherwise lawful non-solicitation policies. 
Of course, the mere fact that an employer may lawfully use work rules to 
restrict non-job-related use of its email and other systems (so long as it does not 
discriminate in enforcing its rules) does not prevent a union from seeking to bargain for 
a contractual right to use employer email systems for union-related business.  Unions 
have long bargained for the right to use employer property, including bulletin boards, 
                                            
4
 Id. at 1114. 
5
 Register Guard, 357 NLRB No. 27 (2011). 
6
 351 NLRB at 1111, 1119.   
7
 Id. at 1111-1112. 
8
 Id. at 1119, 1120.   
9
 See Guard Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
10
 Id. at 60. 
11
 See Register Guard, 357 NLRB No. 27.   
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mailboxes, and meeting rooms, to conduct union business or distribute union 
information.  It is worth noting, however, that using employer email systems for union 
business presents unique problems in that workplace email policies often expressly 
reserve to the employer the authority to monitor the content of employee emails.  The 
result is that while unions may negotiate for the right to use employer email to conduct 
union business, they should be careful about using employer email to communicate 
about information that they wish to remain confidential.  Indeed, unions that do 
successfully negotiate for use of employer email systems should treat employer email 
as they would other public forums, such as an employer bulletin board.   
B. Off-Duty Work-Related Communications Through Social Media 
 
In early 2011, the NLRB’s settlement of an unfair labor practice charge 
contesting the firing of an American Medical Response employee for posting 
disparaging comments about a supervisor on Facebook received wide-spread media 
attention.  After the employee asked for and was denied union representation in 
connection with an investigation of client complaints about her, she posted comments 
on her Facebook page insinuating that the employer allowed a psychiatric patient to be 
a supervisor. She also responded to coworker comments on her post.  She was fired for 
allegedly violating an employer policy prohibiting disparagement of the company or its 
management.  The Board issued a complaint alleging that the employer’s policy was 
overly broad because it prohibited off-duty communication among employees 
concerning wages, hours and working conditions.12  The case settled shortly thereafter. 
Two months later, the Board was in the media spotlight again when it 
reportedly decided to pursue a charge against Thomson Reuters concerning the 
reprimand of a reporter over a Twitter posting.  In that case, a supervisor invited 
employees to “tweet” about how to make Reuters “the best place to work.”  But when an 
employee posted a message saying, “One way to make this the best place to work is to 
deal honestly with Guild[13] members,” she was reprimanded.  That case ultimately 
settled in late 2011.14   
Perhaps as a result of the press coverage of these two cases, an 
increasing number of charges have been filed alleging that employees were disciplined 
for engaging in protected activity on various social media outlets.  Signaling an effort to 
develop a consistent approach to these cases, in April 2011 the Board’s Acting General 
Counsel, Lafe Solomon, instructed regional NLRB offices to submit all charges involving 
employee use of social media to the Office of General Counsel’s Division of Advice for a 
determination as to whether or not a complaint should be issued.  Acting General 
Counsel Solomon has issued periodic memoranda summarizing the Division of Advice’s 
determinations in these cases, in an effort to provide guidance to parties and 
practitioners in this area.  The cases addressed by the Division of Advice, and the 
                                            
12
 See American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., National Labor Relations Board, Office of the 
General Counsel Advice Memorandum (“Advice Memo”), 34-CA-12576 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
13
 Employees in that case were represented by the Newspaper Guild of New York. 
14
 See Thomson Reuters, Advice Memo, 2-CA-39682 (Apr. 5, 2011).  
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Board to date address issues of alleged unlawful employee discipline for engaging in 
protected activity, employer surveillance of protected activity, and overbroad employer 
social media policies.  For the most part, the Board has been applying existing law 
concerning protected activity in the social media world.   
1. Protected Concerted Activity 
 
The Board has long held that employee communications that amount to 
“concerted activity for mutual aid and protection” is protected under the NLRA, and so 
cannot be restricted by the employer.  Protected concerted activity occurs where the 
employee acts “with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by or on 
behalf of the employee himself”15 and “encompasses those circumstances where 
individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or prepare for group action.”16  The 
activity must relate to wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment.  Thus, 
complaints about the performance of coworkers that adversely affect the employee’s 
working conditions are protected.17  However, where complaints about employee 
performance or the quality of service provided by the employer have only a tangential 
relationship to employee terms and conditions of employment the complaints are not 
protected.18  Protest of supervisory action is also protected.19  Although the most clear 
type of protected communications occur when the subject of discussion is collective 
action, employee discussion about shared concerns about terms and conditions of 
employment is protected even when “in its inception [it] involves only a speaker and a 
listener” because this is “an indispensable preliminary step to employee self-
organization.”20   
Applying these rules, complaints over social media about a supervisor 
have been found to constitute protected concerted activity where coworkers respond to 
the posts and a discussion of the issue ensues.21  Similarly, Facebook posts about 
managerial marketing decisions that negatively impact employee commissions have 
been found protected where they grew out of prior concerted complaints to 
                                            
15
 Meyers Industries (“Meyers I”), 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), on remand, Meyers Industries (“Meyers II”), 281 
NLRB 882, aff’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 
(1988). 
16
 Meyers II, 281 NLRB at 887. 
17
 Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Cos., 333 NLRB 850, 850-51 (2001).   
18
 Five Star Transportation, Inc. 349 NLRB 42, 44 (2007), enf’d 522 F.2d 46 (1
st
 Cir. 2008); Waters of 
Orchard Park, 341 NLRB 642, 643-644 (2004). 
19
 Datwyler Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 350 NLRB 669 (2007). 
20
 Meyers I, 268 NLRB at 494; Meyers II, 281 NLRB at 887. 
21
 American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., Advice Memo, 34-CA-12576 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
5
Davidson and Rosenberger: Workshop: Negotiations 102 CLE Credit - Collective Bargaining in
Published by The Keep, 2012
 5 
 
management about the subject.22  A “Tweet” to the effect that the employer should deal 
fairly with the union has also been considered protected.23 
However, the guidance from the NLRB so far indicates that social media 
posts complaining about work-related matters will more likely be considered individual 
griping, rather than protected concerted activity, if no coworkers respond or express 
agreement, and if the employee does not discuss the posts with coworkers,24 or if the 
posts are not an attempt to initiate or prepare for group action.25  Also unprotected are 
posts that do not relate to wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment, such 
as:  complaints about a coworker’s annoying personal habits, qualifications, alleged 
misconduct, tattling on coworkers or inadequate performance;26 complaints about 
customers;27 sarcastic and derisive posts regarding a city’s homicide rate and 
employees of a competitor news organization;28 statements of employees’ intent to 
withhold medical care from patients who offend them;29 and descriptions of a 
client/resident’s odd behavior.30  
Activity or communications that might otherwise be protected concerted 
activity for mutual aid and protection may lose that protection where it is so 
“opprobrious” as to lose the NLRA’s protection.  In considering whether communication 
loses the protection, the Board considers the place and subject matter of the discussion, 
the nature of the employee’s “outburst” and whether the outburst was provoked by an 
employer unfair labor practice.31  Likewise, “[s]tatements are unprotected if they are 
maliciously untrue, i.e., if they are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless 
disregard for their truth or falsity.”32 
                                            
22
 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., ALJ Decision, 13-CA-46452 (Sept. 28, 2011). 
23
 Thomson Reuters, Advice Memo, 2-CA-39682 (Apr. 5, 2011) 
24
 See, e.g., Rural Metro, Advice Memo, 25-CA-31802 (June 29, 2011); JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, 
Advice Memo, 13-CA-46689 (July 7, 2011); Wal-Mart, Advice Memo, 17-CA-25030 (July 19, 2011); 
Sagepoint Financial, Inc., OGC Advice Memo, 28-CA-23441 (Aug. 9, 2011); Frito-Lay, Inc., OGC Advice 
Memo, 36-CA-10882 (Sept. 19, 2011).   
25
 Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center, Advice Memo, 27-CA-65577 (Dec. 1, 2011); 
Copiah Bank, Advice Memo, 15-CA-61204 (Dec. 1, 2011). 
26
 Children’s National Medical Ctr., Advice Memo, 5-CA036658 (Nov. 14, 2011); The Rock Wood Fired 
Pizza & Spirits, Advice Memo, 19-CA-32981 (Sept. 19, 2011); Helser Industries, Advice Memo, 19-CA-
33145 (Aug. 22, 2011); Sagepoint Financial, Inc., Advice Memo, 28-CA-23441 (Aug. 9, 2011); Buel, Inc., 
Advice Memo, 11-CA-22936 (July 28, 2011); Arizona Daily Star, Advice Memo, 28-CA-23267 (Apr. 21, 
2011). 
27
 Public Service Credit Union, Advice Memo, 27-CA-21923 (Nov. 1, 2011). 
28
 Arizona Daily Star, Advice Memo, 28-CA-23267 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
29
 MONOC, Advice Memo, 22-CA-29008 (May 5, 2010). 
30
 Martin House, Advice Memo, 34-CA-12950 (July 19, 2011). 
31
 Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814, 816 (1979). 
32
 Id. 
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Applying these rules, the Division of Advice recently concluded that 
Facebook comments complaining about a union’s representation of employees who 
contested the commenter’s promotion lost any protection it might otherwise have had 
because it also used offensive racial stereotypes which caused disruption in the 
workplace.33  In another case, the Division of Advice found that a post alleging employer 
fraud lost its protection when the employee refused to remove the post after she learned 
that in fact there was no fraud.34   
Generally, as long as an employee’s remarks relate to a labor dispute or 
workplace interests and are not egregious or reckless in nature, they are protected 
under the NLRA, even if widely publicized.35  General disparagement of the employer’s 
product or services by a current, however, is not protected and therefore the Division of 
Advice has opined that a social media policy prohibiting “disparagement of company’s 
or competitors’ products, services, executive leadership, employees, strategy and 
business prospects” was lawful, when read in its context which included prohibition of 
disclosing proprietary information and intellectual property such as product design, 
software, ideas and innovation, explicit sexual references, disparagement of any race, 
religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability or national origin and other comments 
which are clearly not protected under Section 7.36   
When it comes to post-dismissal comments by an unlawfully fired 
employee, however, the employer faces a somewhat higher burden.  The employer in 
such a case may avoid a reinstatement remedy only if the employee engages in 
conduct so flagrant that it renders the employee unfit for further service.37  The Board 
recently applied this rule in a case involving post-discharge blog posts by a news 
reporter criticizing his former employer’s apparent refusal to support its own staff and 
failure to report accurately news of interest to the community.  The NLRB rejected the 
employer’s claim that the employee was unfit for further service, noting that “employees 
who are unlawfully fired . . . often say unkind things about their former employers,” and 
“[e]mployers who break the law should not be permitted to escape fully remedying the 
effects of their unlawful actions based on the victims’ natural human reactions to the 
unlawful acts.”38 
2. Surveillance of Protected Activity 
 
An employer may violate the NLRA if it engages in surveillance of 
protected activity, or creates the impression that it is doing so, because employees 
                                            
33
 Detroit Medical Center, Advice Memo, 7-CA-6682 (January 10, 2012). 
34
 TAW, Inc., Advice Memo, 26-CA-063082 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
35
 Jefferson Standard, NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) 
36
 Sears Holdings (Roebucks), Advice Memo, 18-CA-19081 (Dec. 4, 2009). 
37
 See O’Daniel Oldsmobile, Inc., 179 NLRB 398 (1969). 
38
 Hawaii Tribune Herald, 356 NLRB No. 63 (2011) 
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should feel free to engage in protected activity “without the fear that members of 
management are peering over their shoulders[.]”39  However, an employer does not 
engage in unlawful surveillance where a member of management is invited to 
observe.40  An employer unlawfully creates an impression of surveillance where “the 
employee would reasonably assume from the [employer’s] statement that their union 
activities had been placed under surveillance.” 41 In cases outside the social 
media/electronic communications setting, the Board has found this standard satisfied by 
employer statements indicating knowledge of protected activity that is not generally 
known, and does not reveal the source of its knowledge.42   
Early indications suggest that the application of the standard in cases 
involving an alleged impression of surveillance of electronic and social media may lead 
to a different conclusion.  For example, the Board has held that no impression of 
surveillance was created where a supervisor told employees he knew about a message 
on a password-protected union website, because “we think that a reasonable employee 
would assume that [the supervisor] lawfully learned of [the] message exactly the way 
[he] did—through public dissemination by another website subscriber.”43   In light of this 
holding, the Division of Advice has found no unlawful surveillance where an employee 
limited access to his posts to those whom he had “friended” – because he did not 
“friend” the supervisor in question, the employee could not reasonably believe that the 
supervisor had access to surveil the posts.44  Of course, where the employer learns of 
the employee’s posts because the employee has “friended” a supervisor, the employee 
will be considered to have invited the observation, and so no unlawful surveillance will 
be found then, either.45  Where a coworker who has access to the post voluntarily 
shows the post to the employer, no surveillance will be found.46  It remains to be seen 
whether the Board will find unlawful surveillance where an employer or supervisor 
coerces a coworker to provide access to the employee’s posts. 
  
                                            
39
 Flexsteel Industries, 311 NLRB 257, 257 (1993). 
40
 Donaldson Bros. Ready Mix, Inc., 341 NLRB 958, 960-961 (1976). 
41
 Flexsteel Industries, 311 NLRB 257, 257 (1993). 
42
 Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge, 353 NLRB 1294, 1296 (2009), aff’d 357 NLRB No. 57 (2001) 
(knowledge of union meeting and distribution of union cards); Avondale Industries, 329 NLRB 1064, 1065 
(1999) (knowledge of employee’s support for union). 
43
 Frontier Telephone, 344 NLRB 1270, 1276 (2005). 
44
 Public Service Credit Union, Advice Memo, 27-CA-21923 (Nov. 1, 2011). 
45
 Buel, Inc., Advice Memo, 11-CA-22936 (July 28, 2011). 
46
 Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Ctr., Advice Memo, 27-CA-65577 (Dec. 6, 2011); MONOC, 
Advice Memo 22-CA-29008 (May 5, 2010). 
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3. Social Media Policies 
 
An employer violates the NLRA if it maintains a work rule that “would 
reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”47  A rule is 
unlawful if it explicitly restricts Section 7 protected activity.  If the rule does not explicitly 
restrict Section 7 activity, it may still be found unlawful if one of three criteria is met:  (a) 
employees reasonably would construe the rule to prohibit such activity; (b) the rule was 
issued in response to union activity; or (c) the rule has been applied to restrict protected 
activity.48  Rules that provide specific examples of clearly illegal or unprotected conduct 
are less likely to be considered unlawful, as they could not reasonably be construed to 
cover protected activity.49   
 
Applying these rules, broadly-worded social media policies that prohibit, 
without limitation, communication that is disrespectful, offensive, rude, discourteous or 
inappropriate; or that “may in any way violate, compromise, or disregard . . . the rights 
and reasonable expectations as to privacy or confidentiality or any person or entity” or 
disclose “confidential” or “sensitive” information; or that embarrasses, attacks, insults, 
disparages or harasses employees or agents of the employer; or which might damage 
the employer’s reputation or goodwill; or rules prohibiting employees from responding to 
inquiries from third parties concerning employees, would likely be considered unlawful, 
as employees could reasonably construe such rules to prohibit NLRA-protected 
communications.50  Likewise, a policy that prohibits employees from referencing 
personal information of coworkers, clients, partners or customers without their consent, 
could reasonably be construed to prohibit discussion of wages and other terms and 
conditions of employment.51   A rule prohibiting use of employer logos, photographs of 
an employer facility, equipment, brand or product without permission may reasonably be 
construed to prohibit posting of pictures of the employee carrying a picket sign in front of 
the employer’s premises, or wearing a t-shirt with the employer’s name or logo while 
peacefully handbilling or engaging in other protected activity.52  A broad “savings 
clause” stating that nothing in the policy should be construed to limit NLRA-protected 
rights or other lawful conduct will not be viewed as sufficient to save an otherwise 
improper work rule. 53 
                                            
47
 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enf’d mem. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
48
 Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646-647 (2004). 
49
 See Tradesmen International, 338 NLRB 460, 462 (2002). 
50
 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., ALJ Decision, 13-CA-46452 (Sept. 28, 2011); The Rock Wood Fired Pizza & 
Spirits, Advice Memo, 19-CA-32981 (Sept. 19, 2011); Flagler Hospital, Advice Memo, 12-CA-27031 (May 
10, 2011); American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., Advice Memo, 34-CA-12576 (Oct. 5, 2010); 
Thomson Reuters, Advice Memo, 2-CA-39682 (Apr. 5, 2011).  
51
 Giant Eagle, Inc., Advice Memo, 6-CA-37260 (June 22, 2011). 
52
 Giant Eagle, Inc., Advice Memo, 6-CA-37260 (June 22, 2011); American Medical Response of 
Connecticut, Inc., Advice Memo, 34-CA-12576 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
53
 Giant Eagle, Inc., Advice Memo, 6-CA-37260 (June 22, 2011); Flagler Hospital, Advice Memo, 12-CA-
27031 (May 10, 2011). 
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However, a rule that prohibits employees from “pressuring” coworkers to 
participate in social media communications was found lawful, because it “is sufficiently 
specific in its prohibition against pressuring co-employees and clearly applies only to 
harassing conduct.  It cannot reasonably be interpreted to apply more broadly to restrict 
employees from attempting to ‘friend’ or otherwise contact their colleagues for the 
purposes of engaging in protected concerted or union activity.”54 
II. PRIVACY RIGHTS 
 
A. Public Employees 
 
For employees in the public sector, the Fourth Amendment, which 
prohibits unlawful searches and seizures, provides some protection of privacy in the 
workplace.  The Fourth Amendment is only applicable, however, where the employer’s 
conduct violates an “expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable.”55  A public employee may have a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
it comes to technological equipment provided by his or her employer, but the 
“reasonableness” of an employee’s expectation of privacy is determined on case-by-
case basis.   
For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding a public employee’s work computer where 
the employee occupied a private office and maintained exclusive use of the office, work 
computer, desk, and filing cabinet.56  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that a public 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy where the employee used a 
password protected computer in a locked office.57  The court, in determining whether 
the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy on his work computer, assessed 
factors that would be relevant to the inquiry of whether any public employee has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on her or his work computer:  whether other 
employees had a key to the employee’s office, whether the public employer had a 
regular need to access the employee’s computer, whether the employer or the 
employee had purchased the computer, the lack of any employer policy preventing the 
storage of personal information on employer computers, and the fact that the employer 
never told its employees that their computer usage and internet access would be 
                                            
54
 Giant Eagle, Inc., Advice Memo, 6-CA-37260 (June 22, 2011). 
55
 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).   
56
 Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001), 
57
 U.S. v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds and 
remanded, 537 U.S. 802 (2002).  (While Slanina was a criminal case, the pornography recovered from 
the employee’s computer was recovered in the course of a work investigation.) 
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monitored.   A public employer may also create a reasonable expectation of privacy by 
notifying its employees that they can maintain private files on their computer.58   
On the other hand, where an employee connected his personal computer 
to his employer’s network without a password protecting his files, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.59  The court 
explained that although this was a criminal case, the incident occurred in the workplace.  
Therefore, in its inquiry of whether the employee possessed a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his work computer, the court took into account the employee’s relationship 
to the item seized, whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when 
it was seized, and whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the 
item.60  Although the employee owned the computer, he had failed to password-protect 
it, turn it off when he left the room, or take any other steps to prevent third party use.  
Accordingly, the court determined that the employee did not possess a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
However, a reasonable expectation of privacy alone may not be sufficient 
to protect the public employee under the Fourth Amendment.  In 2010, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed a case in which a municipal employer read employee text 
messages sent and received on an employer-issued pager, without obtaining a warrant.  
Without reaching the issue of whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the messages, the Court found that the warrantless search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.61  In particular, the Court explained that there are “a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions” to the general rule that warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.62  One of those 
exceptions is the “special needs” of the workplace.   
The Court explained that the search was constitutional because: 
 
 It was conducted for a noninvestigatory, work-related purpose or for 
the investigation of work-related misconduct; 
 
 It was justified at its inception; and 
 
 It was conducted according to measures that were reasonably related 
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of 
the circumstances giving rise to the search. 
                                            
58
 See, e.g., Haynes v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 298 F.Supp.2d 1154 (D. Kan. 2003); Maes v. Folberg, 
504 F.Supp.2d 339 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (employee sufficiently pled that she had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding files contained in her government-issued laptop computer because employer had no 
policies or procedures to suggest otherwise). 
59
 U.S. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007). 
60
 Id. at 1248-49.   
61
 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
62
 Id. at 2630.   
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In particular, the search was justified at its inception because the employer needed to 
determine whether the character limit on the employer’s text message contract with its 
wireless company was sufficient to meet the employer’s needs.  This was, according to 
the Court, a “legitimate work-related rationale.”63  Employees had been permitted to use 
the wireless system for personal communications, but had to pay for any amount which 
exceeded the contract amount negotiated with the wireless company.  The employer, 
the Court explained, had a legitimate interest in determining whether it was paying for 
extensive personal communications, or whether employees were being forced to pay 
out of pocket for work-related expenses.  As for the scope of the search, the Court held 
that reviewing the transcripts of the employee’s text messages was reasonable because 
it was “an efficient and expedient way” to determine whether the particular employee’s 
overages were the result of work-related or personal use.64  Finally, because the 
employee was told that his text messages were subject to review and because his 
status as a law enforcement officer should have caused him to know that his use of the 
pager could be scrutinized, the search was not deemed by the Court to be excessively 
intrusive.  
 B. Public and Private Sector Employees 
 
  1. Screening of Job Applicants 
 
A January 2009 CareerBuilder.com survey reported that 45 percent of 
employers search social networking sites to screen job candidates.65  Eighteen percent 
of employers found content on social networking sites that played a role in their decision 
whether to hire an applicant.   The stated areas of concern by employers were: 
 
 Provocative or inappropriate photos or information (53%) 
 Content about drinking or drug use (44%) 
 Content about an applicant’s previous employer (35%) 
 Content showing poor communication skills (29%) 
 Content showing discrimination (26%) 
 Content showing an applicant lied about her or his qualifications (24%) 
 Content showing disclosure of confidential information from a prior employer 
(20%)  
 
Id. at 70-71. 
 
                                            
63
 Id. at 2631.   
64
 Id.   
65
 McCreary, John A., Symposium: Social Networking and Employment Law, 81 Pa. Bar. Assn. Quarterly 
69, 70 (2010).   
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Employers who use information obtained from social networking sites in 
screening applicants should be cautious however, as other information obtained through 
such means may put them at risk for a discrimination claim.  Under Title VII, it is not 
illegal for an employer to learn about the race, gender, disabled status, ethnicity, etc. of 
an applicant.  However, Title VII requires that all applicants be give equal, 
nondiscriminatory treatment in the hiring process.  Therefore, if an employer learns of 
an applicant’s protected status through the applicant’s social media page, such 
knowledge could increase the risk of discrimination or the appearance of 
discrimination.66   
2. Common Law Invasion of Privacy Claims 
Most attempts by private sector employees to challenge employer 
searches of their email or other electronic data are unsuccessful.  For example, one 
court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in email communications 
voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the employer’s email system.67  
That was true even though the employer had assured its employees that their email 
messages would not be intercepted: “Once plaintiff communicated the alleged 
unprofessional comments to a second person (his supervisor) over an email system 
which was apparently utilized by the entire company, any reasonable expectation of 
privacy was lost.”68   
Common law invasion of privacy claims are not completely without 
potential for success, however.   At least one court has acknowledged that an 
employee had a limited reasonable expectation of privacy in personal emails sent 
via AOL.69  However, once those messages were shared in a public chat room, 
they lost any semblance of privacy.  The court, analogizing, to traditional means 
of communication, explained: 
 
E-mail transmission are not unlike other forms of modern 
communication. We can draw parallels from these other mediums. 
For example, if a sender of first-class mail seals an envelope and 
addresses it to another person, the sender can reasonably expect 
the contents to remain private and free from the eyes of the police 
absent a search warrant founded upon probable cause. However, 
once the letter is received and opened, the destiny of the letter then 
lies in the control of the recipient of the letter, not the sender, 
absent some legal privilege. 
 
Similarly, the maker of a telephone call has a reasonable 
                                            
66
 Id. at 72; see also Michael S. Cohen, A Site (Un)Seen: Using Social Media in Hiring Decisions, The 
Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 22, 2010, at 7. 
67
 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F.Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
68
 Id. at 101. 
69
 United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F.Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
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expectation that police officials will not intercept and listen to the 
conversation; however, the conversation itself is held with the risk 
that one of the participants may reveal what is said to others. 
 
Drawing from these parallels, we can say that the transmitter of an 
e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that 
police officials will not intercept the transmission without probable 
cause and a search warrant. However, once the transmissions are 
received by another person, the transmitter no longer controls its 
destiny. 
 
Id. at 1184 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996)). 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court made headlines in 2010 when it held that 
an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her attorney-client privileged 
communications, even though they were conducted from her employer-issued 
computer.70  The court’s ruling was supported in part by the fact that the employer’s 
computer use policy was ambiguous and did not explicitly state that password-protected 
emails were subject to employer audit, and the fact that the employer had allowed 
employees to use their work computers for personal use. 
3. Arbitral Views of Employee Privacy in Employer Systems  
Grievance arbitrators often hold that an employer has a right to monitor 
employee use of employer electronic equipment.  In particular, arbitrators are interested 
in whether the employer notified its employees that their computer use would be subject 
to audit or whether monitoring was surreptitious. 
Arbitrators typically hold that there is no right to privacy in work emails and 
computer files, and that employers may monitor employee computer use, especially 
where an employer has a reasonable belief that a violation of an employer policy is 
occurring.  For example, one arbitrator held that an employee had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when using an individualized email password on company 
equipment.  The grievant sent sexual jokes over the employer’s email system.  Even 
though his email account was password-protected, the arbitrator determined that the 
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy to his work emails: “The password 
prevents other employees from gaining access to material that they have no right to 
view.  It does not protect the employee from the owners of the computer through its 
agents seeing anything that an employee might have in their files.”71  
 
Similarly, another arbitrator permitted employer monitoring to ensure 
compliance with an employer policy prohibiting the storage of offensive materials on 
                                            
70
 Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010). 
71
 PPG Indus. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. 833 (Dichter, 1999). 
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company computers.  In particular, the employer had a policy providing: “It is not the 
Company’s intent to strictly monitor the electronic information created and/or 
communicated by an employee using electronic media.  However, the Company has the 
ability to trace and to monitor usage patterns and gateway activity to the Internet and 
reserves the right to do so.”72  
 
In another case, the employer searched an employee’s computer files 
after a tip from a chat room operator that the employee had posted racially offensive 
messages.  In sustaining the employee’s dismissal, the arbitrator rejected the 
employee’s argument that she did not know that her conduct on her employer’s work 
computer would be traceable back to her employer, especially given the employer’s 
disclaimer on the screen of her work station computer warning her that her computer 
should only be used for work purposes and that the system was being monitored.73 
 
In an example of indirect monitoring of computer use, an arbitrator held 
that photographs of an employee viewing DVDs on his work computer obtained through 
a secretly installed camera were admissible at his arbitration.  In particular, although the 
photos were obtained through a nonconsensual search, the methods employed to 
obtain the photos were was not “excessively shocking to the conscience of a 
reasonable person.”74  However, the arbitrator reduced the discharge to a suspension 
because of the grievant’s spotless work record and the employer’s failure to prove lewd 
and indecent behavior for which it had fired the grievant.  Note, however, that another 
arbitrator reduced the discharge of an employee where the employer installed a secret 
GPS device without notice to the employee.  The arbitrator suggested that secret 
monitoring is generally not appropriate.75 
  4. Federal and State Electronic Privacy Laws 
 
The federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“Act”), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510 et seq., applies to both public and private sector employees.  Title I of the Act 
makes it unlawful for an individual to intentionally intercept a “wire, oral or electronic 
communication.”  This does not include “electronic storage of any such communication.”  
Title II of the Act limits access to electronically stored information, including computer 
files.  There are two exceptions to the Act’s protections.  First, under the “consent 
exception,” an employer policy that reserves the right to intercept, monitor, or access 
work emails and computer files will generally allow the employer to avoid liability under 
the Act.  Second, the “provider exception” permits a person or entity providing a wire or 
electronic communications service to intercept or access electronically stored 
information. 
                                            
72
 Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1299, 1302 (Suntrup, 2005). 
73
 M T Detroit, Inc., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1777 (Allen, 2003). 
74
 Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 257, 260 (Nicholas, 2006). 
75
 Beverage Marketing Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1388 (Fagan, 2005). 
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Applying these rules, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
rejected an employee’s claims under the Act based on an employer search of emails 
sent to and received by an independent insurance agent that were stored in employer’s 
server.  The Title I claim was rejected because the search did not constitute an 
“intercept” as it was not conduced contemporaneously with the transmission of the files.  
The Title II claim was also dismissed based on the provider exception.76  Similarly, a 
federal trial court upheld the employer’s access to employee text messages stored on 
employer’s computer system because the employer was the “provider.”77 
However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employer’s 
surreptitious monitoring of phone numbers received on an employee’s pager could 
constitute a violation of the Act.78  Likewise, where an employer’s purported 
authorization to access the employee’s MySpace account is coerced, a violation may be 
found.79 
Note that additional protections may be available under state law.  A few 
states have laws that restrict an employer’s monitoring of employee email and internet 
use without advance notice, and others have established statutes relating particularly to 
off-duty conduct.  For example:  
 
 California:  Cal. Lab. Code § 96(k): gives authority to the labor commissioner to 
hear claims for loss of wages as a result of an adverse action for lawful conduct 
occurring during nonworking hours.  
 
 Connecticut:  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-48d: compels employers to give notice to 
employees prior to monitoring of email or internet use; limits the restriction where 
an employer has a reasonable belief that an employee is engaging in unlawful 
conduct or conduct that violates work rules.  
 
 Colorado:  C.R.S. § 24-34-402.5: provides protection to employees, but only 
where the employee’s conduct has no connection to the employer’s business 
concern. 
 
 Delaware:  Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 705: requires employers to provide notice to 
employees prior to monitoring email or internet use.  
 
 New York:  NY CLS Labor § 201-(d)(2)(a)-(c): makes it illegal for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee because of an employee’s legal recreational 
activities outside work hours, but no protection is provided to employees where 
there is a material conflict of interest.  
                                            
76
 Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). 
77
 Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996). 
78
 Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001). 
79
 See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group d/b/a Houston’s, No. 06-05754, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88702 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009). 
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Several states have statutes that require prior consent by all parties before any 
communication may be intercepted.  E.g., California (Cal. Penal Code § 632(a)); 
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d(a)); Florida (Fla. Stat. § 934.03); Illinois (720 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-2(a)(1)); Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-
402(c)(3)); Massachusetts (Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 272, § 99B(4), (c)(1)); New Hampshire 
(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 570-A:2(I(a))); Pennsylvania (18 Pa. C.S. § 5704(4)); 
Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(1)(a)). 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
 
Employees often believe that because of their constitutional right to 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment, they cannot be subject to employer 
discipline for what they say or do on-line.  However, the First Amendment protects 
individuals from government infringement on the right to free speech, and so does not 
provide private sector employees with any protection against employer discipline.  Even 
public employees enjoy only a limited protection from employment consequences as a 
result of their speech.  The First Amendment protects a public employee from discipline 
or dismissal due to his or her speech only if: (1) the public employee was speaking as a 
citizen, (2) the public employee was speaking on a matter of public concern, and (3) the 
government employer does not have an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently than a member of the general public.80   
 
If a public employee is speaking as an employee, rather than as a citizen, 
or speaking about a personal employment related matter, rather than a matter public 
concern, the employee has no First Amendment protection from retaliation by the public 
employer.  If a public employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, 
the employee’s speech is protected as long as the public employer had no adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public.  
This inquiry requires an analysis of the importance of the relationship between the 
public employee’s speech and the employment itself.  The public employer has greater 
discretion to limit speech when the limitations it imposes are directed at speech that has 
some potential to affect the government entity’s operations. 
When a public employee speaks “pursuant to his or her official duties,” 
that speech is not protected, as it is not made “as a citizen.”  In practice, this typically 
means that employees who take their speech up the chain of command are not 
protected under the First Amendment, as that speech is a communication made 
“pursuant to official duties.”81 
                                            
80
 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
81
 See, e.g., Meyers v. County of Somerset, 293 Fed. Appx. 915 (3d Cir. 2008) (comments made to 
someone in the chain of command are made pursuant to employment duties and therefore are not made 
as a “citizen”); Meenan v. Harrison, 264 Fed. Appx. 146 (3d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff police officer’s speech 
was not pursuant to his official duties where he went to a media outlet with his concerns about the 
sufficiency of another officer’s investigation into a teacher’s misconduct). 
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The same general principles apply when the speech in question is 
communicated through social media outlets.  For instance, one court held that there 
was no violation of the First Amendment rights of a teacher who communicated with his 
students on MySpace because his speech was not on a matter of public concern and it 
was disruptive to school activities.82  The same result was reached in another case 
regarding MySpace postings on matters of private concern.83  The State of Kentucky’s 
decision to prohibit state employees from accessing blogs from state-owned computers, 
was held not to violate the First Amendment, because it was a reasonable restriction 
implemented in order to prevent employee inefficiency.84   
In a case involving a special education due process hearing officer who 
maintained a blog in which she discussed special education issues, a federal court 
dismissed her First Amendment claim, because the employee’s free speech interest 
was overridden by the employer’s interest in maintaining an impartial hearing process.  
The court held that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the 
hearing officer acted as a private citizen in maintaining the blog, and the parties did not 
dispute that the subject of the blog was a matter of public concern.  However, in light of 
the employee’s employment as a hearing officer, the employer had an interest in 
ensuring that she maintained not only impartiality but also the appearance of 
impartiality.  Her blog posed a legitimate threat to the efficient operation of the 
employer’s due process system, and so did not fall within the protection of the First 
Amendment.85 
Of course, in order to present a viable claim for violation of a public 
employee’s free speech rights, the employer must have taken some action against the 
employee as a result of his or her protected speech.  A federal district court in Florida 
found that an employee satisfied the three-part test for First Amendment protection 
when he posted an internal office memo on his blog page, since he had obtained it 
through a lawful public records request, it dealt with a matter of public concern, and 
there was no evidence that the posting of the memo impacted the employer’s ability to 
carry out its functions efficiently.86  However, the court found that the employer would 
have suspended the employee regardless of this particular posting, because he also 
posted internal emails after he had been told that the investigation that was the subject 
of the emails was still under way and so the emails were confidential.  Employer policy 
prohibited the disclosure of confidential materials, and that violations of the policy could 
warrant dismissal.  Additionally, the employee violated the employer’s procurement 
policies and then misrepresented his actions to the employer.  The court found, based 
                                            
82
 Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F.Supp.2d 292, 297 (D. Conn. 2008). 
83
 Snyder v. Millersville University, No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
84
 Nickolas v. Fletcher, No. 06-00043, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23843 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007). 
85
 Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F.Supp. 2d 564, 574-577 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
86
 Ranck v. Fernandez Rundle, 29 IER Cas. 576, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52257 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
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upon action taken against employees for similar misconduct, that the employer would 
have suspended the employee regardless of his First Amendment protected activity.87 
IV. JUST CAUSE DETERMINATIONS 
 
Arbitrators generally apply traditional concepts of just cause to assess 
employees’ use of social media.  Arbitrators will consider whether other employees 
have been disciplined similarly for similar conduct, the exact nature of the employee’s 
employment (i.e., whether the grievant is a teacher or a firefighter, for example), 
whether the grievant took any measures to either mitigate or aggravate the particular 
harm, whether there is a sufficient nexus between the employee’s conduct and the 
employee’s work, and the extent to which the employer’s ability to carry out its functions 
is affected by the employee’s conduct.  Social media arises in grievance arbitration both 
where the electronic activity constitutes the alleged infraction, and where it merely 
provides evidence of another infraction, such as abuse of sick leave, harassment, and 
the like. 
An example of the former situation is a case in which the arbitrator 
reduced to a suspension the discharge of a transit employee who sent racist jokes via 
text message to coworkers.  The arbitrator found relevant that the text messages were 
sent inadvertently, that the grievant apologized for sending the messages, and that no 
other employee had been terminated for engaging in comparable conduct.88   However, 
the suspension of a firefighter in another case who posted a demeaning rap song on the 
union’s website was upheld.  In sustaining the suspension, the arbitrator explained that 
“there is sufficient case law saying a public employee is not free to criticize publicly his 
employer over employment matters . . . there is sufficient case law for the proposition 
that internal harmony of a fire department may be adversely effected by a firefighter 
undermining supervisory authority by such adverse criticism.”89  In a similar case, an 
employee accessed non-work-related websites from the employer’s computer on work 
time, and printed out racist material.  He inadvertently left a few pages of jammed in the 
printer, which were discovered by other employees.  The arbitrator reduced the penalty 
in that case from a 20-day suspension to five days, in light of the fact that the employee 
did not intentionally leave the material for other employees to see.90 
The dismissal of a teacher was sustained where the school administration 
received an anonymous package from parents with printouts from a webpage 
containing nude pictures of the teacher. The arbitrator, holding the teacher to a higher 
standard because of her important role as an educator, held that discharge was 
appropriate because of how easily accessible the websites containing the photos were, 
the fact that the teacher was nude or nearly nude in the photos, and that the websites 
                                            
87
 Id., 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 52257 at *38-*45. 
88
 WMATA/Metro, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. 972 (Evans, 2007). 
89
 Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1638, 1658 (Rosen, 2008). 
90
 City of Fort Lauderdale, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1249 (Abrams, 2008). 
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referenced explicit sexual acts.91  In contrast, however, where there was an insufficient 
work nexus between internet pictures of teacher performing faux salacious acts and her 
work as a teacher, no just cause for discharge was found.  As the arbitrator explained, 
“it did not directly involve either the school or her capacity to teach.”92   
A three-day suspension of a 21-year teacher for placing insensitive posts 
on his Facebook page alluding to a student’s excuse for late arrival to a performance 
was reduced to a reprimand.  The arbitrator found it significant that the employee had a 
spotless discipline record, and that the posts were not made through employer email or 
communications systems, and were not intended to harass the student, who did not 
have access to the page.  Also significant was the employer’s failure to establish that its 
anti-bullying policy was ever disseminated or posted.93 
A Head Start teacher who created a private Facebook “group” was fired, 
and her dismissal was upheld, because she posted comments that denigrated parents, 
students and staff in vulgar and profane terms, and included her endorsement of a 
“what appeared to be . . . racist threats toward a supervisor and threats toward” a 
coworker.  The arbitrator determined that the employee’s conduct disrupted the team 
atmosphere that the employer sought to build, and violated the employer’s policies 
requiring respect for students and their families and against discriminatory conduct.94 
National origin-based harassment was found to justify the dismissal of an 
employee who posted derogatory information on his blog referring to his plant manager 
as a “German, green card terminator” and comparing him to Hitler.95  
An employee may even be disciplined because of information that is 
posted on the internet by someone else.  For example, an arbitrator sustained the 
discharge of a teacher whose estranged wife posted nude photos of the teacher on 
social media sites and the photos were discovered by parents, teachers, and the press.  
The arbitrator’s decision was based in large part on the teacher’s failure to take 
sufficient measures to prevent his estranged wife from making the photos public.96  
Another arbitrator denied the grievance of an employee whose prior conviction as a sex 
offender was registered on a state’s public website.  The arbitrator agreed that the 
publication undermined the company’s image and could undermine public confidence in 
the employee’s work.97 
 
On the other hand, a termination was reduced to a 30-day suspension 
where an emergency room nurse posted on her Facebook page a photo showing 
                                            
91
 Phenix City Bd. of Educ., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1473 (Baroni, 2009). 
92
 L’Anse Creuse Pub. Schs., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. 527, 530 (Daniel, 2008), 
93
 American Arbitration Association Award, reported at 2011 WL 1928139 (AAA) (Mazurak, 2011). 
94
 Vista Nuevas Head Start, 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1519 (VanDagens, 2011) 
95
 Baker Hughes, Inc., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. 37 (Baroni, 2010). 
96
 Warren City Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. 532 (Skulina, 2007). 
97
 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ohio, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1489 (Paolucci, 2005). 
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several $100 bills with the caption “The things you find on your patients with no jobs,” as 
well as a post stating that “[the employer] can GFY!!!”  The arbitrator found that the 
employer had failed to establish that the photo involved any actual patient, or that the 
employee herself had taken the photo.  He found the second comment serious, but that 
the two incidents of misconduct did not warrant dismissal.98 
In an example of a case in which the employee’s electronic activity 
provided evidence of another infraction, an employer viewed pictures of an employee 
online dancing at a bar and assumed that the employee had been dishonest about the 
reason for her tardiness to work.  The arbitrator held that the employer failed to prove 
through the photos that the employee had lied about her reason for being late, and 
sustained the grievance. 99 
An employee’s post-discharge posting on Facebook of a photo of the 
former employee burning his work attire provided the arbitrator with a basis to modify 
the remedy.  The employee was reinstated without backpay, and with a warning 
concerning the Facebook posting.  It was perhaps significant that in that case, the 
reason for the employee’s dismissal was his statement that he was “going to burn this 
f***ing place down.”100 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Social media and other electronic forms of communication have 
significantly – perhaps irrevocably – changed our professional and social interactions in 
a very short period of time.  When it comes to electronic communications that occur in 
or relate to the workplace, however, arbitral, administrative and judicial caselaw 
indicates that the “rules of the road” are slow to change.  For the time being, at least, 
decisionmakers are applying existing principles that grew out of cases involving verbal 
or written communications before the advent of social media.  As long as that is the 
case, employees and employers both would be well-advised to think before they post, 
monitor or promulgate social media policies. 
 
 
                                            
98
 American Arbitration Award, reported at 2010 WL 5583163 (AAA) (Lowe, 2010). 
99
 Shawnee County, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1659 (Daly, 2007). 
100
 American Arbitration Association award, reported at 2011 WL 2099034 (AAA) (Doering, 2011). 
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